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ABSTRACT  The absence of explicit reference to sport in the EU Treaties has 
allowed the Court and the Commission room to require sport to adjust to the standards 
required by EU law. Sporting federations typically assert a need for a wider zone of 
autonomy than the Court and Commission have been prepared to grant, but, unable to 
persuade the Member States that they deserve exemption from the application of the 
Treaty, sports bodies have increasingly been induced to develop strategies of co-
existence with the EU. This article shows how they were able to exert influence in 
both the Convention on the Future of Europe and the subsequent intergovernmental 
conference in order to secure recognition of sport’s special characteristics within the 
Treaty, albeit in ambiguous form. Sports bodies engage with the EU precisely in order 
to minimise its impact. The relevant provisions of Treaty of Lisbon dealing with sport 
are examined to show that they leave open scope for future contestation about the 
interaction between EU law and policy and systems of sports governance. 
KEY WORDS Convention on the Future of Europe, Intergovernmental conference; 
Lisbon Treaty; lobbying; sport 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) operates according to the principle of conferral found in 
Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). This means that it may act only 
in areas where its treaties so authorise. Until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
on 1 December 2009 sport was not even mentioned in the Treaty. Nevertheless first 
the Court of Justice and subsequently the Commission have insisted that in so far as 
sport constitutes an economic activity it falls within the scope of the Treaty. 
Accordingly the increasing financial clout of professional sport has brought with it 
increasing vulnerability to litigation driven by players, clubs and broadcasters. In so 
far as practices have been found incompatible with EU law significant change has 
been demanded within sport. So, famously, the Court’s 1995 ruling in Bosman1 
required the abandonment of direct discrimination on the basis of nationality in club 
football and the adjustment of the player transfer system. Sport bodies have long 
resented the intervention of EU institutions, for it constitutes a curtailment of the 
cherished autonomy of sport (see Chappelet 2010: 11-20 and 33-37). That autonomy 
is lost in so far as the EU treaties apply, and the consequence is the creation of two 
‘separate territories’: a territory for sporting autonomy and a territory for legal 
intervention (Parrish 2003a: 3, Weatherill 2007). Although both the Court and the 
Commission accept that sport is in some respects distinct from ‘normal’ industries 
they have typically taken a much narrower view of the special character of sport than 
that pressed upon them by sports federations, who typically criticise intervention as 
inadequately sensitive to the peculiar characteristics of sport (for example UEFA 
2007). The contest, then, is over the extent to which the territory for sporting 
autonomy should be invaded by legal intervention.  
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Governing bodies in sport have enjoyed no success in persuading the Court or the 
Commission that sport is of no concern to the EU, though they have enjoyed some 
success in arguing that particular challenged practices are compatible with the Treaty. 
This suggests that an approach based on acceptance in principle of the EU’s proper 
involvement in sport combined with strategies to persuade its institutions that sporting 
practices are not incompatible with EU law might offer the most rational way 
forward.  
Engaging with the EU in order to soften its intrusive effect was the principal strategy 
deployed directly and indirectly by sports organisations in the process of negotiation 
that led from the Convention on the Future of Europe to the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
has for the first time brought sport explicitly within the Treaties (see García 2007a). It 
may seem a paradox that actors whose main aim is to shelter their territory from 
incursion by the EU should be willing to embrace explicit inclusion of their industry 
in the Treaty. This, however, is rational once one understands that the structure of the 
Treaty, and in particular its broad functionally-driven emphasis on building an 
internal market, asserts a textually uncontrolled competence to regulate many sectors 
which are not explicitly within its reach. Including sport in the text of the Treaty is an 
attempt to exercise control over the direction taken by the Court and the Commission. 
This article explores the methods chosen by sport bodies and reveals that they have 
been able to exercise significant political leverage in recent negotiations, albeit that 
the ultimate prize, exemption from the Treaty, remains inaccessible.  
The article analyses legal and policy documents and the empirical presentation is 
supported with information selected from a total of 45 semi-structured interviews with 
officials from EU institutions, national governments and sports organisations 
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conducted during the Treaty negotiations between May 2004 and February 2007. The 
relevance of the data obtained in the interviews (and presented in this article) was 
confirmed through a process of respondent validation, to ensure the accuracy of our 
narrative.  
The article proceeds in four steps. First we review the origins of EU sports law and 
policy. Second, the article explores the efforts of the sporting movement to gain 
Treaty recognition at Amsterdam, Nice and in the Convention on the Future of 
Europe. Third, the article explores the negotiations that led to the inclusion of sport in 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Finally, we assess the consequences of the relevant provision, 
Article 165 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the 
ambiguity of which promises further episodes in which sport bodies will seek to 
engage with the EU’s institutions in order to persuade them to play a limited 
interventionist role.  
 
THE CONTESTED GROWTH OF EU SPORTS LAW AND POLICY 
In its first ever ruling on sport, Walrave and Koch,2 the Court concluded that even 
though the Treaty did not mention sport, its practice fell within its scope in so far as it 
constitutes an economic activity. This landmark ruling set the scene for a potentially 
broad basis of review of sporting practices against the standards demanded by EU 
law. However, the fact that a matter falls within the scope of EU law does not 
necessarily mean it is incompatible with it. In Walrave and Koch the Court proceeded 
to consider the particular matter at hand, the limitation of national representative 
teams to nationals of a particular country. This, one might suppose, offended a 
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foundational value of the Treaty, the prohibition against nationality-based 
discrimination. However, the Court added that such a rule ‘does not affect the 
composition of sport teams, in particular national teams, the formation of which is a 
question of purely sporting interest’ (para. 8). There is therefore room for sport to 
show why it is different from normal industries: in this instance, nationality 
discrimination defines the very nature of the activity and consequently it escapes 
prohibition.  
This legal model allows for a cohabitation of sporting regulations and EU law. 
Despite debate about the nature of this so-called ‘sporting exception’ (see Parrish and 
Miettinen 2007), its basic definition is relatively straightforward: Once it is 
demonstrated that a sporting practice exerts economic effects it falls within the scope 
of the Treaty. It then falls to the sports regulator to show a justification for the 
measure – and the justification may properly include reliance on material and 
concerns that are peculiar to sport. 
The famous ruling in Bosman3 fits this model. The Court considered that rules 
governing the transfer of players and rules requiring nationality-based discrimination 
in club football exerted effects on player mobility and contractual negotiation. They 
therefore fell within the scope of the Treaty. This did not mean they were unlawful: it 
meant only that they required justification. The Court accepted that ‘the aims of 
maintaining a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and 
uncertainty as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and training of young 
players must be accepted as legitimate’ (para. 106). While finding that the particular 
practices impugned in Bosman fell foul of the Treaty because they did not adequately 
contribute to these legitimate aims, the Court showed itself receptive to embrace of 
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the special features of sport, even though these were not explicitly recognised by the 
Treaty.  
In similar vein the Court in Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commission4 held that the 
economic damage the application of anti-doping rules may exert on an individual 
athlete means that they cannot be placed beyond the reach of the Treaty. However, it 
accepted that such rules may be essential for the proper functioning of a sport.  It had 
not been shown that the challenged anti-doping rules went beyond what was 
necessary for the organisation of the sport. As the Court put it, restrictions imposed by 
sports federations ‘must be limited to what is necessary to ensure the proper conduct 
of competitive sport’ (para. 47). This is a statement of the conditional autonomy of 
sports federations under the Treaty. And, of the highest significance, it implies the 
need for a case-by-case analysis of sporting practices rather than any general 
possibility of exemption (Wathelet 2006, European Commission 2007a).  
The Commission, following the Court’s lead, plays an important role in controlling 
sporting autonomy pursuant to the Treaty competition rules. It took account of sport’s 
peculiar economics in its ENIC/UEFA decision5, in which it concluded that rules 
forbidding multiple ownership of football clubs suppressed demand but were 
indispensable to the maintenance of a credible competition marked by uncertainty as 
to the outcome of matches. A competition’s basic character would be shattered were 
consumers to suspect collusion. Sporting practices typically have an economic effect, 
but within the area of overlap between EU law and ‘internal’ sports law there is room 
for recognition of features of sport which may differ from ‘normal’ industries.  
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EU SPORTS POLICY IN THE MAKING 
An emerging ‘policy on sport’ is the product of complex and dynamic interactions 
which may usefully be compared with policy formation in other sectors (Meier 2009), 
albeit that its character is influenced by the eccentric development generated by the 
Treaty’s absence of any sports-specific material and the essentially incremental nature 
of litigation and complaint-handling (Van den Bogaert and Vermeersch 2006).  
Sporting bodies have frequently objected to the very fact of EU involvement. This, 
however, is fruitless protest unless the Court abandons its approach which locates 
practices with an economic effect within the scope of the Treaty. This seems highly 
improbable. They have also complained that the EU institutions misperceive the 
nature of sport according to an economic bias inherent in the Treaty; and they believe 
that the case-by-case approach confirmed by the Court in Meca-Medina exposes them 
to uncertainty (Zylberstein 2007). Their concerns are rooted in their obligation to 
defend sporting practices on the terms dictated by EU law.  
The scale of the problem is open to dispute. The impact of EU law is not always 
transformative. Anti-doping procedures were not outlawed by Meca-Medina; 
restraining multiple ownership of clubs was authorised by ENIC/UEFA. Even where a 
violation of the Treaty is established it is characteristic that the Court does not dictate 
how sporting bodies shall behave – its role is limited to deciding whether particular 
practices may not be pursued. So after Bosman the transfer system was not 
abandoned, but rather adjusted by the industry itself; in particular sports bodies were 
able to retain rules designed to protect contractual stability against players wishing to 
move without club consent (Brand and Niemann 2007). For some sports bodies, 
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UEFA in particular, a strategy of co-operation with the EU has been chosen as the 
most promising way to promote awareness of sporting exceptionalism in the 
decisional practice of the EU’s institutions (García 2007b). This concern to work with 
the EU’s institutions in order to restrain their interventionist bite is visible in the 
strategies chosen by sports bodies in the long review process that led to the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 
THE INSERTION OF SPORT INTO THE TREATY: BEFORE LISBON 
The Amsterdam and Nice declarations  
Judgments of the Court which interpret provisions of the Treaty carry entrenched 
force in the sense that they can be altered only by the Member States acting 
unanimously at times of Treaty revision. It is rare indeed that consensus can be 
assembled at the necessary moment, and the Court’s judgments on sport have never 
been set aside in this way. But subtler forms of influence may be pursued. Failing to 
convince the Court and Commission of their case for exemption from the application 
of EU law, governing bodies resorted to politicisation of what was initially a legal and 
regulatory process (Parrish 2003a, Ch. 6). It is within this political turn that the efforts 
of sporting bodies to achieve Treaty recognition for sport (with the ultimate goal of 
controlling the Court and Commission’s interference) have to be understood. 
Concern to introduce an explicit mention of sport in the Treaties dates back to the mid 
1980s. The current president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Jacques 
Rogge, who was at that time chairing the association of European Olympic 
Committees (EOC), played a key role in raising sport’s awareness of the value of such 
change. He also drove the first lobbying efforts aimed at national governments under 
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the umbrella of both the EOC and the European Non-Governmental Sport 
Organisations (ENGSO): ‘Some contacts were made during the Inter Governmental 
Conference (IGC) leading to the Maastricht Treaty, but the Member States did not 
contemplate sport as a priority at all. In any case this was just a first contact, because 
the real discussions did not really start until about 1992 or 1993’.6  
 
The argument of the sporting movement has been historically built around two 
concepts: the specificity of sport and the autonomy of sports federations as regulators 
within their discipline. To promote these ideas, an intensive lobbying strategy was 
designed, taking into account the multi-level nature of the EU, the resources of sport 
organisations in Brussels and, especially, their contacts at national level through 
national federations and National Olympic Committees.7 The so-called sporting 
movement is perfectly equipped to engage with the EU machinery, for it presents an 
almost perfect match for the EU’s multilevel structures. Contacts were designed with 
a wide range of EU policy actors in order to nurture a constant dialogue. High level 
political contacts between the IOC president, European Commissioners and EU Heads 
of State and Government were developed. At the same time, national sports bodies 
were mobilised to lobby their respective national governments and, where possible, 
their representatives in the European Parliament. 
 
By the time of the Nice Treaty, the Convention and the Lisbon Treaty, the contacts 
between the sporting movement and EU institutions in relation to Treaty change were 
fluid. As Kingdon (1995: 128-129) points out, issues are more likely to be considered 
on political agendas after a period of ‘softening-up’. Political leaders (especially from 
Germany and France) were persuaded to bring sport into the negotiations that led to 
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both the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaties. In the former case, it was ‘probably too 
early for the case of sport’, whilst in the latter ‘political negotiations on institutional 
reform did not allow much time for other issues’.8 Nevertheless, in the European 
Council political leaders expressed a vision of the relationship between EU law and 
sport.  
 
The Declaration on Sport attached to the Amsterdam Treaty asserts that ‘the 
Conference emphasises the social significance of sport, in particular its role in forging 
identity and bringing people together. The Conference therefore calls on the bodies of 
the European Union to listen to sports associations when important questions affecting 
sport are at issue. In this connection, special consideration should be given to the 
particular characteristics of amateur sport’.  
 
In the months leading to the Nice European Council of 2000, the sporting movement 
increased its efforts to achieve recognition in the Treaty. The IOC, the EOC and 
ENGSO presented in February 2000 a common declaration to the governments of the 
Member States; this argument was reinstated in July through a letter sent by IOC 
President Juán Antonio Samaranch to the French President (Miège 2001: 183). The 
support of the French presidency and its minister of sport, Mrs. Buffet, was essential 
to ensure incorporation of sport on to the agenda of the IGC and the European Council 
(Miège 2001: 184). The Declaration on ‘the specific characteristics of sport and its 
social function in Europe, of which account should be taken in implementing common 
policies’ annexed to the Conclusions of the Nice European Council held in December 
2000 is a more elaborate document (3 pages, as compared to the mere 50 words of 
Amsterdam), which is symptomatic of the rising importance of sport on the EU 
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political agenda. The Nice declaration reveals a similar tone to Amsterdam’s. The 
institutions are called to ‘take account of the social, educational and cultural functions 
inherent in sport and making it special, in order that the code of ethics and the 
solidarity essential to the preservation of its social role may be respected and 
nurtured.’ The European Council calls also for the preservation of ‘the cohesion and 
ties of solidarity binding the practice of sports at every level’.  
 
These statements demonstrated that the tension between the EU’s absence of explicit 
competence in the field of sport and the activity of its Court and Commission in 
applying the rules on free movement and competition had squeezed out a political 
response. Both Declarations, however, are formally non-binding and their content is 
vague and aspirational. They do not subvert the application of the fundamental Treaty 
rules to sport. Indeed the Court rushed to make this point, finding the Amsterdam 
Declaration ‘consistent’ with its own case law.9 Neither the Amsterdam nor the Nice 
Declaration was remotely close to the prize coveted by sport federations – partial or 
(most glittering of all) total exemption from the application of the rules of the Treaty. 
Yet for sport organisations both declarations were positive, for ‘the support of 
Member States had increased from Amsterdam to Nice’.10 
 
Sport at the Convention on the Future of Europe 
The Convention on the Future of Europe accepted that the EU should acquire some 
formal competence in the field of sport; this, like so much of the Convention’s work, 
was then reflected in the agreed text of the Treaty establishing a Constitution; and 
this, like so much of the Treaty establishing a Constitution, then found its way into the 
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Treaty of Lisbon. The involvement in the negotiations of parties with interests in sport 
was largely informal, even hidden, yet highly effective. They did not secure 
exemption. But they did secure recognition of sport’s special character. 
 
The Convention opened in February 2002. A ‘Digest of contributions to the Forum’, 
prepared in the summer of 2002 in advance of a plenary session on civil society, 
blandly advised of a ‘call for a specific legal basis for support for sport’.11 In fact, 
sport was not a high-profile issue in the debates and even the few documents that 
referred to it were in the main confined to brief comment without elaboration.12 Those 
contributions which displayed more ambition were grouped around a common anxiety 
that legal intervention undermines the special character of sport. They were 
consequently inclined to more legally durable protection than was provided by the 
Amsterdam and Nice Declarations.13 This tone is consistent with that typically 
advanced by sporting federations, and it underlines the impression that, for sports 
bodies, EU intervention is better controlled by explicit provisions written into the 
Treaty than by the long-standing pattern which had left sport outside the formal text 
of the Treaty. 
 
The Praesidium presented a ‘preliminary draft Constitutional Treaty’ to a plenary 
session on 28 October 2002. There was no place for sport. However, the draft text 
proposed by the Praesidium and released on 6 February 2003 inserted sport into Part I 
of the Treaty as an area where the EU would be competent to take ‘supporting action’ 
(Article III-282 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution).  
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This is the first of two occasions in the progress of negotiation where those pressing 
the interests of sport were able to secure adjustment as a result of well-targeted 
lobbying. An Annex to the text of 6 February 2003 explained that the insertion of 
sport followed on from the ‘conclusions of Mr Christophersen’s group’.14 This is a 
reference to Working Group V on Complementary Competencies, chaired by Henning 
Christophersen, a Danish politician and former member of the Commission. However, 
although within the Working Group Mr Speroni, an MEP representing the Italian 
Government, had pressed for sport to be included,15 the final report of the Working 
Group, published on 4 November 2002, was not persuaded. It declared that ‘A 
proposal providing for the adoption of supporting measures with respect to 
international sports was not broadly supported’ and sport was consequently excluded 
from the list of matters which the Working Group recommended be treated as apt for 
supporting measures adopted by the EU.16 
 
The Chair of the Working Group believes that the inaccurate reference to its 
recommendation was made simply by mistake, and that one must look elsewhere to 
understand why sport was added to the list of proposed new competences between 28 
October 2002 and 6 February 2003.17 It is difficult to identify an individual 
responsible for the inclusion of sport in the Praesidium’s draft, but it is possible to 
trace the debates and influence of different actors that contributed to that decision. 
John Kingdon (1995) points out that policy decisions are exceptionally difficult to 
trace to a single point of origin or person, for there are normally several contributory 
factors. He argues, however, that it is possible to analyse the conditions that make 
decisions possible and the reasons why some policy options are preferred to 
alternatives. Kingdon’s assertion is apt: the process at the Convention was dynamic, 
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and sports bodies proved well-equipped to operate on but also beneath the formal 
record.  
 
A variety of sports organisations presented written contributions to the so-called 
Forum of the Convention, where civil society bodies were invited to participate. The 
IOC, the National Olympic Committees of France and Germany, ENGSO and the 
Austrian Sports Confederation submitted co-ordinated documents, whilst major 
federations such as the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and the 
International Football Federation (FIFA) also contributed (Parrish 2003b: 39). These 
were on-record contributions for the benefit of all Convention members and, to some 
extent, they were a formal exercise. More importantly, from the very beginning of the 
Convention the sporting movement organised lobbying targeted at different levels:  
 
We tackled this issue of the European Convention at quite an early stage. 
We [the IOC and EOC office] enabled our partners to take action towards 
the [Convention] representatives of their countries, we prepared the 
papers, the arguments, we talked to all the different kind of representatives 
in the Convention. We had meetings with members of the Praesidium of 
the Convention, with the secretariat, with the Commission (…)18  
 
The importance of the working groups was recognised, but contacts were also built 
before and after Mr Christophersen’s group reported back to the Convention: ‘We 
followed the working groups and for us the response of Christophersen was actually 
not very positive, but nevertheless we succeeded in putting our message across on 
other fronts’.19 Lobbying by sports organisations during the Convention combined 
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high and low level meetings, as explained above, but towards the end it was the 
political weight of IOC President Jacques Rogge which pushed the Convention 
Praesidium to include sport:  
 
We had meetings with members of the Praesidium of the Convention, for 
example [Klaus] Haensch, the German MEP represented in the 
Praesidium. We also had a meeting with chairman of the Convention, 
Giscard d’Estaing. But that was quite at the end, when Jacques Rogge met 
Giscard d’Estaing. Klaus Haensch was one of the main contacts for us and 
also Erwin Teufel, who used to be the  Prime Minister of Baden-
Württemberg, and was the representative of the Bundesländer in the 
Convention. We organised, for example, a meeting with all the German 
representatives in the Convention; we sat together with these people and 
we presented our position. That is what we also organised or initiated for 
other countries for our partners, so there was a lot going on. 20 
 
Crucially, the sporting movement’s lobbying in favour  of inclusion of sport in the 
Treaty was aligned with the agendas of Member States. In this respect, the support of 
European ministers of sport proved vital to move the debate forward, although not all 
Member States were convinced of the case: 
 
It was quite a long effort. The sports ministers had debated in depth the 
necessity of having an article on sport since 2000, but it was probably 
after reaching an agreement on our participation in WADA in 2002 that 
we pushed with real determination for the article. It was a great common 
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effort. I think that perhaps one of the decisive moments was the Greek 
presidency [first half of 2003]. The Greeks organised a sports ministers 
meeting in Brussels and they did a brilliant job because they also invited 
the Commission and the sporting movement. They presented the case for a 
Treaty article brilliantly, because Minister Beniselos, who is also 
Professor of Law back in Athens, analysed perfectly the level of EU 
competences that sport could get (…) It was a tough meeting, nonetheless. 
We faced opposition especially from the UK. The British team had 
reserves because they did not want to commit, even if it was informally, to 
any addition of new competences in the Treaty. They were very cautious 
(…) It was a difficult negotiation, but we managed to get the agreement, 
in principle, of the UK, which was almost a victory for all of us. 21 
 
With that agreement at a key moment in 2003, the sports ministers strengthened their 
political case, bringing the agendas together at the decisive moment of the 
Convention:  
That Greek Presidency coincided with the works of the Convention. It was 
then when we [European sports ministers] intensified our political 
lobbying in the Convention, we had to convince as many people as 
posible. We submitted a declaration from Spanish and French Convention 
members in support of the inclusion of sport and tried our best, but the 
first draft did not incorporate sport. We had then to raise our level of 
lobbying at the highest level through the governments and thankfully with 
the collaboration of all of us the Praesidium finally accepted to 
incorporate sport into the Treaty. 22 
16 
 
 
The European Commission Sports Unit also worked in favour of an article on sport. 
The political intervention of Commissioner Viviane Reding (then in charge of sport 
within her Education and Culture portfolio) influenced the Praesidium, especially 
through conversations with Michel Barnier and Antonio Vitorino, who were 
representing the Commission in the Praesidium. 23 The Commission not only provided 
an important last push, but (in close consultation with sports ministers) it was also 
behind the wording of the article: 
 
Jaime Andréu [former Head of the European Commission Sports Unit] 
would say it is his article, it is the Commission’s wording, which perhaps 
is true but not the whole truth (…) He put it in circulation, so the wording, 
if you put it to the wording, probably comes from the [European 
Commission] sports unit. But the will to implement this article was a 
common project to prepare the will of these decision makers, was a 
common project of the sports organisations, sports ministers and the 
Commission.24 
 
Thus, the Praesidium’s decision to incorporate sport in the February 2003 draft 
Constitution was largely unopposed, and probably also unnoticed by most members of 
the Convention: ‘Sport is an important issue for us of course, but we always benefit 
from the fact that, at the end of the day, it is relatively marginal in the wider scheme 
of EU politics, so people do not necessarily pay excessive attention’.25 Indeed it was 
declared in May 2003 that the drafts of new legal bases, including that pertaining to 
sport, had ‘in general been well received’.26 Sport’s inclusion as an area in which the 
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EU should be explicitly empowered was by now insufficiently contentious to emerge 
as a sticking-point. 
 
The efforts of the European sports ministers to convince their own governments and 
then other Convention members, together with the determination of the European 
Commission’s sports unit, complemented the case presented by sports organisations. 
There were certainly differences in the objectives of the several interested parties, as 
explained below, but they all shared a common objective to see sport recognised in 
the Treaty. The decision to incorporate sport in the final Convention draft confirms 
Greenwood’s (2007: Chapters 1 and 5) view of effectiveness in EU lobbying, which 
points out that alignment of policy objectives may in some cases be more important 
than economic resources.  
 
Sport at the IGC 
The Convention over, the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome in July 2003 established 
sport as an area of ‘supporting, coordinating or complementary action’ and added 
detailed provisions in a new article under the title Education, Vocational Training, 
Youth and Sport (Article III-282). This provided that ‘The Union shall contribute to 
the promotion of European sporting issues, given the social and educational function 
of sport’. Union action was to be aimed at ‘developing the European dimension in 
sport, by promoting fairness in competitions and cooperation between sporting bodies 
and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, 
especially young sportsmen and sportswomen’.  
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The ambition was plainly that an explicit reference to sport should help to preserve 
sport’s autonomy, rather than because of any belief that the EU should assume a more 
active regulatory role. This is a strategy of empowering the EU in order to restrain it. 
However, the text agreed in 2003 was in this respect not satisfactory to some 
concerned to defend sport’s interests. This is the second of two occasions in the 
progress of negotiation where those pressing the interests of sport were able to secure 
adjustment as a result of well-targeted lobbying. The Treaty establishing a 
Constitution finally agreed in late 2004 included sport alongside education, youth and 
vocational training as an ‘area of supporting, coordinating or complementary action’, 
while the substantive elaboration provided that ‘The Union shall contribute to the 
promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of 
sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational 
function’ (authors’ emphasis). 
 
What is the ‘specific nature of sport’? The notion was aired at the Convention. In 
November 2002 a contribution by Duhamel and Beres simply proposed that the Union 
be committed to recognise ‘the specificity of the sport’.27 The phrase also appears in a 
small number of other contributions but its intended impact is not elaborated.28 In 
general ‘specificity’ is best understood as the ‘next best’ argument of sporting bodies 
after autonomy. Autonomy is a claim to immunity. Specificity is a claim to have the 
law moulded in application to meet sport’s special concerns. However, the concept 
was excluded from the text finally agreed by the Convention in July 2003 and had to 
await agreement on the Treaty establishing a Constitution in December 2004 for its 
re-emergence, in the form of the ‘specific nature of sport’. Why was it added after the 
Convention had concluded its work? 
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The answer lies largely in lobbying by the IOC and the EOC, the support of the sports 
ministers and, above all, to the important figure of the Italian Mario Pescante. With 
the IGC under Italian presidency, Pescante had a perfect position, for he was President 
of the EOC and, at the same time, Italian sports secretary. Pescante was the sporting 
movement’s ‘Trojan horse’. The Italian presidency (second half of 2003) organised an 
informal meeting of EU sports ministers in Florence, where the objective was to 
consider the amendment of the Convention’s version of the article on sport.29 Before 
that meeting Pescante circulated a draft of a new version of the article. In it he put 
forward what could be considered the maximum ambition of the sporting movement. 
It contained references to both the autonomy and specificity of sport:  
 
We were lucky that the IGC was under Italian presidency because Mario 
Pescante’s work was extremely important and influential. The Italian 
presidency presented a new wording for the article, different to the 
Convention’s. He [Pescante] wanted to include all our [i.e. the sports 
ministers’] objectives, namely sports autonomy, specificity, education and 
anti-doping. 30 
 
During that meeting in Florence the sports ministers first agreed to maintain the article 
on sport for the IGC and they then negotiated on the basis of Pescante’s document: 
 
We had to negotiate a lot because there was some opposition. We trimmed 
down the Italian proposal, but I would say we reached a general 
agreement. There was only opposition from the UK, Ireland and Denmark 
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if I remember correctly. But it was more of a formal opposition. That was 
an informal meeting of sports ministers, so they were very cautious in not 
committing to anything formally. They said they had to report back. Yet, 
there was a general sense that we needed to recover that article on sport. I 
think it was also very important the agreement of the new Central and 
Eastern European Countries, who were already participating in our 
meetings.31  
 
The opposition of the British, Irish and Danish governments to the principles agreed 
in Florence was overcome with a mixture of peer pressure from the other Member 
States and high level lobbying by the IOC and the national Olympic Committees of 
the affected countries. The British case was quickly solved once the government 
realised it would be detrimental for the London 2012 bid to oppose the IOC.32 There 
was still some way to go towards the final wording of the article on sport. First, the 
informal agreement of the sports ministers had to be revised by the legal service and 
ratified by the Member State representatives in the IGC (i.e. the foreign affairs 
ministers). More importantly, the Commission was unhappy with the agreement in 
Florence: ‘That text was difficult to accept, it gave too much space to sports 
organisations, we could never allow that with the case law of the Court, which is very 
clear’.33 Plainly the Commission has no veto and would have been powerless had 
there existed a political consensus in favour of sweeping aside the Court’s 
interventionist case law. However, as had already been plain in the drafting of the 
Nice Declaration, there was no real appetite among national governments to pursue 
such radical modification of the Treaty, and accordingly the legal and political 
preferences of the Commission carried weight with the sports ministers and with the 
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IGC’s legal services. Negotiation during the final months of the IGC further adjusted 
the text agreed in Florence: 
 
The Commission was unhappy with the text we agreed in Florence. We 
had to negotiate with them before the end of the IGC. We set up a 
negotiating party between the Member States and the Commission that 
started to modify and trim down the text. Little by little, meeting by 
meeting we went on trying to fine tune the article. In the end we got to a 
text that the Commission was happy with and that we [the sports 
ministers] also accepted. Yes, it is short, perhaps we could have said more 
about autonomy or specificity, but it covers the objectives of the sports 
ministers.34 
 
The text agreed between the sports ministers and the Commission is what was finally 
accepted by the IGC in Naples in November 2003 and duly incorporated in the body 
of the Treaty establishing a Constitution. Thus, the reference to the specificity of sport 
that can be found in what is today Article 165 TFEU was rescued by the sports 
ministers negotiating in 2003 with the Commission on the basis of the proposal put 
forward by the sporting movement. It is a compromise in true EU style. It is also a 
story which reveals sport’s lobbying expertise. The intensity of interaction described 
in this paper, conducted entirely unnoticed on the formal record of the Convention 
and the IGC, was skilfully guided through all available fora, most prominently the 
Convention but also the subsequent IGC, exploiting leverage over national 
governments and the Commission (in particular). Sports bodies deserve to be 
understood as part of the fabric of ‘élite pluralism’ which characterises EU interest 
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politics (Mazey and Richardson 2006, Coen 2007). In addition the shaping of the 
outcome confirms the highly influential role played by the EU Presidency, both 
generally (Niemann and Mak 2010) and in the particular context of negotiation over 
Treaty revision (Beach 2005). Sport enjoyed the crucial advantage of an ‘insider’ 
within the IGC’s Italian Presidency, Mario Pescante.  
 
THE TREATY OF LISBON 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution, mortally wounded by its rejection in referenda 
in France and the Netherlands during 2005, was laid to rest in 2007. The Lisbon 
Treaty was agreed in 2007 and, after unsteadily clearing a series of political and 
constitutional hurdles, the Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009.  
 
The principal strategy behind the drafting of the Lisbon Treaty was that it should be 
sufficiently different from the Treaty establishing a Constitution to justify withdrawal 
of the promise of a referendum (everywhere but Ireland) but not so different that the 
substance of the planned institutional reforms would be lost. How different it truly 
was remains a matter of persisting controversy (Dougan 2008), but in the particular 
case of sport the narrative is one of consistency. What was agreed in the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution was left untouched in 2007 as the Lisbon Treaty was 
negotiated and agreed. The deals had been done: for sport, Lisbon left the package 
untouched. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty therefore brings sport within the explicit reach of the founding 
Treaties for the first time. In formal terms, it is profoundly significant. However, the 
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detailed content of this competence newly granted by the Member States to the EU is 
far less remarkable. Title XII of Part Three of the TFEU covers Education, Vocational 
Training, Youth and Sport. Article 165 TFEU stipulates that the Union ‘shall 
contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the 
specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and 
educational function’. And, pursuant to Article 165(2), Union action shall be aimed at 
‘developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in 
sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by 
protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially 
the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen.’ Article 165(3) adds that the Union and the 
Member States ‘shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent 
international organisations in the field of education and sport, in particular the Council 
of Europe’. 
 
ASSESSMENT: A DECLARATION OF PEACE? 
A Treaty which ignored sport completely was a Treaty which, in the hands of the 
Court and the Commission, controlled sporting autonomy with some vigour. Absent 
political consensus conducive to granting sport exemption from the Treaty, the ‘next 
best’ solution for those engaged in sports governance was to write sport into the 
Treaty in a way that would constrain the interventionist tendencies of the EU’s 
institutions. This is the motivation that drove the adjustments made by the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
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However, the terms of the new provisions are sufficiently ambiguous to guarantee 
further disputes about the impact of EU law on sporting practices. This is no 
declaration of peace. 
 
Article 165 TFEU creates a legislative competence pertaining to sport and allows a 
budget to be dedicated to sport. The first EU Sports Council met under Spanish 
Presidency in May 2010. However, there is no likelihood of dramatic change. The 
newly created legislative competence is ‘supporting’, the weakest type available to the 
EU under Article 6(e) TFEU. Article 165(4) TFEU adds that the Parliament and 
Council may adopt ‘incentive measures’ but they may not harmonise laws concerning 
sport. There is no suggestion in the Treaty that the Union is equipped to play a 
powerful role in regulating sports governance. This is firmly in line with the plan 
mapped out by the Commission in its 2007 White Paper on Sport, designed to provide 
a framework for the EUs activities whether or not the Lisbon Treaty secured approval 
(European Commission 2007a, b). The White Paper, like the Nice Declaration before 
it, is pitched in terms which are deferential to the value of sites for the regulation of 
sport other than the EU in general and the Commission in particular. It declares that 
sporting organisations and Member States have a primary responsibility in the 
conduct of sporting affairs. 
 
It is significant that after the Lisbon Treaty reforms sporting bodies can no longer 
claim that sport is none of the EU’s business. Instead one would expect them to claim 
that it is the EU’s business but only to a limited extent, and only in so far as respect is 
shown for its ‘specific nature’. The key to the Lisbon adjustments will be whether 
they affect the interpretation of the Treaty provisions on free movement and 
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competition which the Court and Commission have applied to sport ever since the 
Walrave ruling in 1974. 
 
It is possible that the ‘specific nature’ of sport will be found to amount to nothing 
different from matters which the Court and Commission have in the past been 
prepared to admit to the legal analysis of the compatibility of sporting practices with 
the Treaty – such as the place of national representative teams and the need for 
uncertainty of outcome. Even in advance of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission’s 
2007 White Paper included a section entitled ‘The specificity of sport’ (European 
Commission 2007a: para. 4.1). This is to be approached through ‘two prisms’, dealing 
with the specificity of sporting activities and of sporting rules (separate competitions 
for men and women, limitations on the number of participants in competitions, the 
need to ensure uncertainty concerning outcomes and to preserve a competitive balance 
between clubs taking part in the same competitions) and the specificity of sport 
structures (the autonomy and diversity of sport organisations, a pyramid structure of 
competitions from grassroots to elite level connected by solidarity mechanisms, the 
organisation of sport on a national basis, and the principle of a single federation per 
sport). A general exemption from the Treaty is ‘neither possible nor warranted’ 
(European Commission 2007b: 69, 78); and there is a need for case-by-case scrutiny. 
The problem from the perspective of sport is that these concessions to ‘specificity’ are 
made on the terms dictated by the decisions of the Court and the Commission. This 
anxiety had driven the Independent European Sport Review, published in 2006 
(Arnaut 2006) and heavily influenced by UEFA, which deployed the discourse of 
‘specificity’ in pressing for a wider exclusion from the Treaty than the case law of the 
Court admits (Miettinen 2006). The 2007 White Paper largely ignores this plea. 
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Consequently it generated renewed criticism that the conditions imposed on sporting 
autonomy by EU law are inapt to take account of the particular features of sport and 
that in any event their case-by-case application breeds unpredictable disruption (Hill 
2009). The fear for sports bodies is that the Lisbon reforms are simply more of the 
same. 
 
After Lisbon the Treaty’s explicit recognition of sport’s ‘specific nature’ will 
doubtless provide the first line of defence. And it is at least possible that the Court and 
the Commission will be tempted to show a greater deference to sporting choices than 
they did prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Union action shall be aimed 
at ‘developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness 
in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and 
by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, 
especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen.’ This is a mix of the obscure and 
self-evident. ‘Fairness’ could be a glib notion which has no policy bite or it could 
convey a very specific commitment to competitive balance. Sports bodies might argue 
that practices which restrain competition should nonetheless be treated as compatible 
with the Treaty in so far as they achieve a better balanced distribution of wealth 
within a sport as a device to promote ‘fairness’. This has particular resonance in the 
matter of sale of broadcasting rights, where sporting bodies have frequently though 
with mixed success argued that joint, rather than individual, selling should be treated 
as a justified means to raise income which can be spread in order to improve 
‘solidarity’ in the game (Parrish & Miettinen 2009, Weatherill 2010). The problem for 
sports bodies is that the place where resolution of these finely balanced issues occurs 
is the place where it has always occurred: before the Commission or ultimately the 
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Court. Sporting bodies have achieved a protection of sorts in the Treaty, but they have 
not escaped the grip of the EU institutional architecture. 
 
CONCLUSION 
On 30 November 2009, the day before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, IOC 
President Jacques Rogge commented that ‘It really is time to move from a case-by-
case approach to an environment where the specific characteristics of sport can be 
taken into account properly’.35 This was quickly followed up by publication of a 
‘Common Position’ on the implementation of the TFEU (Olympic and Sports 
Movement 2010). Twin themes animate the document: a desire for more concrete 
guidance on the impact of EU law and pressure for confirmation of the autonomy of 
sports organisations. It is declared (p. 2): 
 
The Olympic and Sports Movement must be a key player in defining 
which sporting rules shall be recognised as specific, and accordingly are 
to be governed uniquely by sports federations. The intention is not to 
obtain an exemption from EU law, but a specific application of EU law to 
sport.  
 
This is a good deal more subtle than past pleas for a sporting exemption, commonly 
accompanied by aggressive disdain for the EU’s pretensions. Moreover, as part of a 
strategy of ensuring participation and influence, it is proposed to extend existing 
cooperation between the Olympic and Sports Movement and the Commission to 
include also permanent consultation with the Parliament and the EU Sports Council. 
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A failed strategy of ‘keep the EU out!’, which would have been realised only by the 
total exemption of sport from the EU Treaty, has been replaced by a preference to 
work more co-operatively while seeking to use the EU’s own Treaty, and most of all 
its reference to the ‘specific nature’ of sport, as a basis for confining its intrusion. This 
was the story behind the negotiations at the Convention and again at the IGC, and it is 
the blueprint for the future. It is, however, not clear whether the Lisbon Treaty, 
despite bringing sport explicitly within the Treaty for the first time, has changed the 
scope or character of the conditional autonomy from EU law that sport has long been 
forced to tolerate. One may therefore predict a re-affirmation of strategies of co-
operation with the EU’s institutions, because ultimately sporting bodies will have to 
win their battles to protect their preferred methods of operation at the same venues as 
before, in Luxembourg and in Brussels.  
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